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CHAPTER ONE 
                                 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The protections afforded by labour legislation apply only to those persons who fall within the 
ambit of an “employee” as defined in the LRA 66 of 1995.1 Apart from excluding members of the 
National Defence Force and the State Security Agency2, the LRA does not apply to workers who 
are not defined as employees in terms of the LRA. An employee is defined in section 213 of the 
LRA as, 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the state and 
who receives or is entitled to receive, any remuneration, and  
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer;  
and “employed” and “employment” have meanings corresponding to that of “employee”3.  
Part (a) of the definition is rooted in the common law contract of employment, whilst part (b) 
provides an inclusion to the effect that the person must assist another person in any other manner 
to conduct his or her business. The LRA explicitly excludes independent contractors from the 
ambit of protection of labour legislation. It draws the line between employment and other 
commercial relationships but does not define the term independent contractor. 
 
Though the definition of employee appears banal and simplistic, within it, it conceals a complex 
debate on how to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor. The definition does not 
state how to draw the line between employment and independent contracting. As argued by 
Grogan,4 the definition begs as many questions as raised by the common law definition which has 
been there since time immemorial.  Others have argued that though part (b) of the definition would 
indicate “an intention to extend the definition beyond common law employees, it has been 
interpreted narrowly”.5 Thus, debate has centred on whether the definition must be interpreted 
narrowly or ebulliently.6 The erosion of the archetypal employee has resulted in certain groups of 
                                                 
1 Such protections include an array of labour rights such as the right against unfair dismissal, right against unfair 
labour practices and social security benefits. 
2 Section 2 of the LRA. 
3 An identical definition of employee is also found in sections 1 of the BCEA, EEA and SDA. 
4 Grogan J, Workplace Law (2011) 16.  
5 Benjamin P, “An accident of history: Who is (and who should be) an employee under South African labour law,” 
(2004) 25 ILJ 787 at 789 (hereinafter “An accident of history”). 
6 Du Toit D et al, “Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide,” (2006) 74. 
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workers who are employees for purposes of labour legislation escaping regulation. This is so since 
the definition of an employee is premised on the setaceous distinction between a contract of 
employment and that of an independent contractor. This is the same definition which was 
applicable thirty four years ago which was described by Mureinik7  as resulting in labour statutes 
occupying “a loose and ill-defined ground”. If a similar definition was not clear thirty four years 
ago, then the changed nature of employment in modern day world of work poses significant 
challenges.  
 
Historically, our courts developed a number of tests,8 to identify an employee in indecipherable 
cases. These tests include the control test, integration test, economic reality test and dominant 
impression test. Regrettably, these tests have struggled to adequately capture the diversity of the 
labour market and the atypical forms of employment arising today. Inconsistencies in their 
application have led to the absence of a unified approach when determining whether one is an 
employee or not.9 This has resulted in courts looking beyond the wording of employment contracts 
and examining the underlying reality in a bid to determine whether one is an employee or not. 
Such an approach has resulted in workers who are not employees in the full contractual sense but 
because their employment mirrors that of persons under a contract of employment being classified 
as employees for purposes of labour legislation.10 Despite such a purposive interpretation, it has 
been argued by Benjamin11 that “the jurisprudential basis for identifying reality of an employment 
relationship in our law remains unclear”. The courts have not yet developed an adequate policy 
driven approach in dealing with what has become a significant challenge to the efficacy of 
employment legislation. 
 
In 2002 the legislature fashioned responses to these problems of interpretation and disguised 
employment through amendments to the LRA and the BCEA, by introducing a rebuttable 
presumption of employment in sections 200A of the LRA and 83A of the BCEA. As noted by Van 
                                                 
7 Mureinik E, “The Contract of Service: An Easy Test for Hard Cases,” (1980) 97 SALJ 246 at 58.  
8 See e.g.  Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC); SABC v McKenzie (1999) 20 
ILJ 585(LAC). 
9 Zondo AJ in Medical Association of South Africa v Minister of Health (1997) 18 ILJ 528 (LC) at 536. 
10 See SITA v CCMA (2008) 7 BLLR 611 (LAC); Murray v Minister of Defence [2008] 6 BLLR 513 (SCA). 
11 Benjamin P “An accident of history” at 794. 
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Niekerk12  the presumption does not change the statutory definition of an employee, it merely 
codifies the common law tests. In 2006 NEDLAC issued a code titled, “Code of Good Practice: 
Who is an employee? (“the Code”). The purpose of the Code is to promote clarity and certainty as 
to when an employment relationship exists and combat disguised employment.13 
 
Despite a plethora of intercessions by the courts and the legislature, drawing the line between 
employment and other commercial relationships has always remained a challenge. Today’s labour 
market has given rise to a stupefying array of atypical and disguised forms of employment – some 
for reasons driven by new forms of work organisation and others to avoid labour legislation.14 This 
erosion of the archetypal employee has resulted in the distinction between an employee and 
independent contractor becoming increasingly blurred. Though they have been changes in the 
world of work, the definition of employee in labour legislation is still rooted in the common law 
and has been around for ages. It is now questioned whether the definition is still germane. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Though courts and the legislature have attempted to resolve the debate on how to interpret the 
statutory definition of employee, the definition has not been amended and is still rooted in the 
common law. Put simply, labour legislation has maintained the problematic common law 
distinction between employment and independent contracting, without attention being given to 
either uncertainty of the operation of the common law or the disparity between the often fictitious 
line that is drawn between independent contractors and employees. The erosion of the archetypal 
employee is another contemporary threat to the existence of labour law.15 This is so given that for 
one to enjoy the protections afforded by labour legislation he or she must be defined as an 
                                                 
12 Van Niekerk A, “Employees, Independent Contractors and Intermediaries”, (2005) CLL 15 (2) at 12. 
13 A brief discussion of few cases provides a contemporary insight: General Industries Workers Union of SA obo 
Members/Ntombi Weavers [2013] 8 BLLR 843 (CCMA) (weavers who delivered completed products to family 
business were found not to be employees); Kaingane/Trio Data Business Risk Consultant [2004] 12 BALR 1538 
(CCMA) (security guard paid per report submitted found not to be an employee); UPUSA obo Mpanza/Soectra 
Creations Workers Co-operative Ltd [2010] 6 BALR 608 (NBCCMI) (a member of a co-operative was deemed 
employee for purposes of the LRA because the co-operative was formed merely to escape obligations under labour 
legislation).  
14 Benjamin P, “Decent work and non-standard employees: Options for legislative reform in South Africa: A 
discussion document” (2010) 31 ILJ 845. 
15The dilemma is summed up by Supiot M, “The transformation of work and the future of labour law in Europe” 
(1999) 138 (1) International Labour Review 31 at 34. 
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employee. The statement by Van Niekerk16 that, “the labour market is dynamic, and for that 
reason, labour legislation is never immune from critical reflection, and when necessary, revision,” 
is apposite.  
 
There is need to re-evaluate the statutory definition of employee and ascertain whether it is still 
germane with modern day work arrangements, international labour standards and constitutional 
framework. This would inevitably raise several questions relating to the interpretation of the 
statutory definition of employee. These questions include the following: When does one become 
an employee for purposes of labour legislation? Is the statutory definition of employee 
underpinned by the common law contract of employment? Should the definition be interpreted 
narrowly or expansively? Does the definition presuppose the existence of a valid contract of 
employment? Does the constitutional right to fair labour practices in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution expand the ambit of the statutory definition? Is the definition still apt and consistent 
with international labour standards? 
 
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Identifying one as an employee is the avenue for enjoying the statutory protections and rights 
afforded by labour legislation. For this reason it is important that the confusion, which usually 
arise as a result of lack of precision on the definition of employee be clarified. The vertical 
disintegration of production has placed many vulnerable workers beyond the protective ambit of 
labour and social security legislation.17 The study will therefore determine the exact scope of the 
statutory definition of employee and its objectives can be summarised as follows: 
(a)To determine when one becomes an employee for purposes of application of labour legislation. 
(b)To distinguish an employment relationship from other commercial relationships. 
(c)To determine whether labour legislation only applies if the contract of employment is valid. 
(d)To evaluate whether the statutory definition of employee is rooted in the common law contract 
of employment and capable of covering all forms of employment. 
                                                 
16 Van Niekerk A et al Law @ Work (2012) at 15. 
17 See also Mills SW, “The situation of the elusive independent contractor and other forms of atypical employment 
in South Africa: Balancing equity and flexibility?”(2004) 25 ILJ 1203 at 1210. 
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(e)The study will clarify the jurisprudential basis and rationale for interpreting the statutory 
definition of employee purposively and expansively. 
(f)The study is also aimed at establishing whether the statutory definition of employee is apposite 
and consistent with the constitution and international labour standards.  
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Identifying who is an employee for purposes of labour legislation has always been labour’s 
perennial problem.  Most writers are of the view that the problem is not in the definition of 
employee but the manner in which it has been interpreted by the courts. Benjamin18 argues that 
the definition is open to an expansive interpretation, but historically it has been interpreted 
restrictively. He recognises that the labour market is changing and has been characterised by 
casualisation and externalisation of labour.  As a result of these changes Benjamin argues that the 
continued application of the traditional common law tests in distinguishing an employee from an 
independent contractor has resulted, “in a situation in which boundaries of labour law are poorly 
defined resulting in a number of employees being denied protection”.19 It is for this reason that he 
advocates for a purposive and expansive interpretation of the definition which is in the line with 
the Constitution and the purpose of the LRA. Similarly Brassey, 20 is also of the opinion that the 
definition must be interpreted expansively. 
 
Vettori21 starts by questioning the viability of the requirement of a valid contract of employment 
for one to qualify as an employee for purposes of labour protection.  She posits that the existence 
of an employment relationship is not dependent solely on the conclusion of a valid and enforceable 
contract.  Her position is motivated by the court decisions in Discovery Health22 and Kylie,23 and 
she argues that there is need to interpret the definition broadly so as to cast the net of labour law 
protection more widely.  Emphasis should be on the existence of an employment relationship as 
                                                 
18 Benjamin P “An accident of history” at 787. 
19 Benjamin P “An accident of history” at 789. 
20 Brassey M, “The Nature of Employment” (1990) 11 ILJ 889 at 979. 
21 Vettori S, “The Extension of Labour Legislation Protection to Illegal Immigrants” (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 818-830. 
22 Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC). 
23 Kylie v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC). 
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opposed to its form.  This is not only in line with the statutory definition but also section 23 of the 
Constitution24. 
 
Van Niekerk25 and Du Toit26 acknowledge that the statutory definition of employee though wide, 
non-descriptive and rooted in the common law, there is need of formulating a definition premised 
on the employment relationship rather than the contract of employment.  It is for this reason that 
these writers argue that emphasis should be on the existence of an employment relationship. The 
definition of employee must be interpreted widely so as to include de facto (statutory) employees 
who do not have valid and binding contracts of employment.27 Cheadle28 also supports an 
expansive interpretation of the definition.  Inspired by findings of the CC in SANDU v Minister of 
Defence29, he argues that if the constitutional labour rights extend beyond the confines of the 
contract of employment to include contracts “akin” to such contracts, then the definition of 
employee should be generously interpreted and the exclusion of independent contractors narrowly 
construed. Unlike the above jurists, Norton30 and Selala,31 argue that only common law employees 
should be afforded protections offered by labour legislation.  In answering the question of whether 
labour legislation only applies if the contract of employment is legal, the writers argue that 
contracts of employment, which are illegal are null and void and cannot be enforced at all.  In other 
words these writers advocate for a narrow interpretation of the statutory definition and argue that 
the constitutional right to everyone must be qualified and only restricted to common law 
employees. 
 
The lodestar for this research will be the position that the statutory definition of an employee must 
be interpreted expansively and in line with the Constitution and purpose of the LRA.  All writers 
are of the view that the problem is not in the definition of employee but the manner in which it has 
                                                 
24 Le Roux R, “The Worker, Towards Labour Laws New Vocabulary”, (2007) 124 SALJ 469. 
25 Van Niekerk A et al Law @ Work (2015) at 79. 
26 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (2006) at 73. 
27 These are different with common law employees where a valid contract of employment is essential. 
28 Cheadle H, “Labour Relations” in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights (2006) at 18-3. 
29 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC). 
30 Norton D, “Workers in the Shadows, An international comparison on the law of dismissal of illegal migrant 
workers” (2010) 31 ILJ 1521. 
31 Selala KJ, “The enforceability of illegal employment contracts according to the Labour Appeal Court: Comments 
on Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC) (2011) 14 PER/PELJ 207. 
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been interpreted.  The research shall build on and extend this argument by questioning the reason 
for clinging to a definition of employee borrowed from the 1956 LRA and the continued use by 
the courts of the common law tests.  The research will endeavour to critique the jurisprudential 
basis for identifying reality of an employment relationship as opposed to its form. 
 
1.5 SCOPE OF STUDY 
The definition of employee in social security legislation such as the UIA, COIDA and OHSA differ 
in material respects with the statutory definition of employee in principal labour legislation. This 
research will only be limited to the statutory definition of employee as provided for in principal 
labour legislation, namely, the LRA, BCEA and SDA. Logistical constraints preclude examination 
of the equally problematic issue of identifying who is the employer or employing entity especially 
in triangular employment relationships.32 Further, the doctrine of vicarious liability will not be 
dealt with in detail. It will only be referred to in passing in an attempt to distinguish an employee 
from an independent contractor.33 
 
1.6 ASSUMPTIONS 
The study is based on the following assumptions: 
(a)That the statutory definition of employee is still rooted in the common law. 
(b)Though rooted in the common law the statutory definition of employee does not presuppose the 
existence of a valid contract of employment.  
(c)The definition of an employee is open to an expansive interpretation and must be interpreted in 
light of the Constitution, purpose of the LRA and international labour standards. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study entails a doctrinal analysis of the definition of employee under labour legislation. Its 
focus will be on the world of work and the distinction between employment relationships from 
other commercial relationships. It will attempt to determine the exact scope of the definition of 
employee. This will be done through legal research from statutes, international labour standards, 
                                                 
32 These relationships are discussed in detail by Harvey S, Labour brokers and workers’ rights: Can they co-exist in 
South Africa? (2011) 128 (1) SALJ 100. 
33 For serious reflection: Okpabula C & Osode P Government Liability: South Africa and the Commonwealth (2010) 
293-360. 
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texts, articles, journals and case law authorities. It will adopt a descriptive, analytical and critical 
approach to desk, electronic and other materials available on the topic under study.  
 
1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and deals with the subject matter of the study, statement of the 
problem, the research questions, aims and objectives of the study, literature review, assumptions, 
research methodology and outline of chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 will give a background of the establishment of the employment relationship under the 
common law and will outline the various forms of work. It will then deal with the development of 
the dichotomy between an independent contractor and an employee under the common law. It will 
also evaluate and critique the various common law tests developed by courts to identify the elusive 
employee. 
 
Chapter 3 will start by giving a brief historical background of the statutory definition of employee 
from 1909. It will give a critique of the current legislative framework of the definition of employee. 
In doing so, the thesis will attempt to answer questions raised in the problem statement. 
International labour standards will be dealt with so as to ascertain whether what South Africa has 
is best practice. 
 
Chapter 4 will address possible reforms and recommendations before conclusions are made. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDENTIFYING THE ELUSIVE EMPLOYEE UNDER COMMON LAW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A meaningful study of labour law is not complete without at least a rudimentary understanding of 
the common law contract of employment. The common law remains applicable in the realm of 
labour law unless ousted by clear, unequivocal and express provisions of statute or by necessary 
implication. It is therefore necessary that the origins of the distinction of an employee from an 
independent contractor be traced. This would entail a reflection on the history and context under 
which the duality developed and a general background of the establishment of the employment 
contract. A study of these developments does not only explain the past, but it also provides an 
insight into the present problems of identifying an employee from an independent contractor. 
 
2.2 THE COMMON LAW 
The common law is the basis on which the employment relationship is founded and is relevant to 
labour law. Relevance of the common law is reflected in sections 8 (3) (a) and 39 (2) of the 
Constitution which demand that the common law be developed to bring it in line with the 
Constitution.34 Though the Constitution compels a mind shift from a linear common law approach 
to a polycentric socio-economic approach, it remains a relevant source of labour law.35 It is 
therefore essential to consider the legal nature of the employment relationship under the common 
law. In South Africa, the common law is made up of rules and principles reflected in the body of 
law called Roman – Dutch law and a collection of rules and principles made by Judges in previous 
cases. Roman-Dutch law which has its roots in Roman law was imposed by early European settlers 
and adulterated by English law as it was being developed by the courts. 
 
2.3 ROMAN DUTCH LAW 
The modern contract of employment owes its origins to the Roman law locatio servi, the law which 
regulated the hire of slaves. Since work was performed by slaves no contract of employment 
                                                 
34 Cohen T, “Implying Fairness into the Employment Contract,” (2009) 30 ILJ 2271. 
35Jonker v Okhalamba Municipality (2005) 26 ILJ 782 (LC). 
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existed. The relationship between a slave and his master was governed by the law of property.36 
From this relationship the locatio conductio- letting and hiring of services was developed. This 
locatio was applicable where a master permitted his slave to work for another person in return of 
remuneration which did not accrue to the slave but the master.37 The contract of lease (locatio) in 
terms of which services could be hired out was categorised in three distinct classes, namely, locatio 
conductio operarum, locatio conductio operis and locatio conductio rei. This distinction was based 
on the type of performance rendered for the payment of money.38 
(a) Locatio conductio operarum 
Basson39 defines it as a consensual contract in terms of which a free men (liberi) agreed to let his 
personal services (oparae suae) to another person (conductor operarum) for a certain period of 
time, in exchange for remuneration. 
(b) Locatio conductio operis 
It is an independent contract in terms of which a person was engaged to perform specific work on 
behalf of the hirer in consideration for a fixed amount of money and involved work such as training 
of a slave or doing artisanal work. 
(c) Locatio conductio rei 
This contract regulated the letting and hiring of some physical object or thing such as land, a horse 
or a slave for payment. The hirer gained the temporary use of a thing for a fee.  
 
The modern contract of employment was developed from the locatio conductio operarum and was 
distinguished from other forms of work. It gained popularity during the industrialisation era in 
Britain. This distinction was assimilated in South African legal system in companion of cases: 
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance v MacDonald,40Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner41 
and R v AMCA Services. The distinction is fundamental to labour law because of the different legal 
consequences which flow from the various forms of contracts. For instance, under the common 
law only employees could render their employers vicariously liable for unlawful acts committed 
                                                 
36 Thompson C and Benjamin P, South African Labour Law (2006) at E1-2. As noted in the case of De Beer v 
Thompson and Son 1918 TPD 70 it was for this reason that the relationship between employer and employee was 
always referred to as that of a master and servant. 
37 Thompson C and Benjamin P supra at E1-2. 
38 Du Plessis JV and Fouche MA, A Practical Guide to Labour Law (2006) at 9. 
39 Basson AC et al Essential Labour Law (2005) at 19. 
40 1931 AD 412. 
41 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
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in the course and within the scope of their employment.42 Moreover, an employer owes employees 
the duty to take reasonable care of their health and safety whereas this duty is limited in respect of 
independent contractors. Though South African courts followed the Roman law distinction and 
adopted the locatio conductio operarum as the foundation of the employment relationship, they 
also inherited the problems associated with drawing the line between the contract of employment 
and the contract of work.43 Thus, the debate on who is an employee is not new, it owes its origins 
to the disputation under the common law on how to distinguish the locatio conductio operarum 
from the locatio conductio operis. 
 
2.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
The basis of the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor under the common 
law is the contract of employment. It is the foundation of the employer – employee relationship 
and Mischke44 submits that it is only by looking at the contract of employment that it can be 
determined if one is in an employment relationship or not. Grogan,45 defines a contract of 
employment as, 
“a contract between two persons, the master (employer) and the servant (employee), for the letting 
and hiring of the latter’s services for reward, the master being able to supervise and control the 
servant’s work.” 
Though Rycroft and Jordaan46 acknowledge the existence of different definitions of a contract of 
employment, the common denominator evident from all the definitions indicative of an 
employment relationship are:  voluntary agreement, between two parties namely the employer and 
employee, the employee places his or her labour potential at the disposal and under the control of 
the employer and remuneration in money or in kind. Denudated to its bones a contract of 
employment is not different with any other contract. It can be constituted in writing or orally and 
it can also be inferred from conduct of the parties.47 Since the common law is premised on the 
principles of freedom to contract and work under any conditions parties are free to agree on any 
terms and conditions of employment. These terms can either be express, tacit or implied.  
                                                 
42 See Grogan J Workplace Law (2011) at 15. 
43 Brassey M “The Nature of Employment” (1990) 11 ILJ 889 at 893. 
44 Mischke C in Basson AC et al “Essential labour law” (2002) at 38. 
45 Grogan J Workplace Law (2011) at 16. 
46 Rycroft A and Jordan B, A Guide to South African Labour Law, (1992) at 34-44. 
47 Mackay v Comtec Holdings (Pty) Ltd (1996) 7 BLLR 863 (IC); Grahamstown Municipality v Saunders 1906 EDC 
197. 
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2.4.1 Requirements for a valid employment contract 
The general formalities applicable to any contract under the law of contract are also applicable for 
a valid employment contract to be consummated. If the contract does not comply with these 
requirements such contract is void. In Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife48 it was held that for a 
contract of employment to come into existence the common law requirements for an acceptance 
of an offer must be satisfied. If an offer and acceptance of employment is subject to fulfilment of 
a future event, then the contract of employment will only come into operation upon fulfilment of 
the suspensive condition.49 There must be agreement on the subject matter and contents of the 
contract and the performance of the parties’ obligations in terms of the contract must be possible. 
The parties to the contract of employment must have the capacity to contract. An employee can 
only be a natural person, though the employer can either be a natural or juristic person. The 
conclusion of a contract of employment and obligations arising thereof must be lawful. Contracts 
of employment which are tainted with illegality are void and of no force. Persons under such illegal 
contracts are not regarded as employees and are not entitled to any rights.50 Once the employment 
contract is concluded, the employer has a duty to pay the employee remuneration51 which is subject 
to agreement by the parties.  
 
2.4.2 Who is the employee under the common law? 
Under the common law, the nature of the legal relationship between the parties is gathered 
primarily from the terms and conditions of the agreement concluded by the parties.52 The essential 
elements of a contract of employment are sufficient to identify an employee as distinct from an 
independent contractor. In order for a court to establish whether someone is an employee it has to 
determine whether or not a contract of employment is in existence. This is a fundamental 
jurisdictional fact, as common law rights on employment only apply to employees under a contract 
of employment. Thus, an employee under the common law can be defined as a person who 
                                                 
48 (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC). 
49 See Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Mangele (2005) 26 ILJ (LAC); Bayat v Durban Institute of Technology (2006) 27 ILJ 
188 (CCMA); SITA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2008) 7 BLLR 611 (LAC). 
50 Dhlamini v Protea Assurance Co. Ltd 1974 (4) SA 906 (A); Chambers v Process Consulting Logistics (Pty) Ltd 
[2003] 4 BALR 405 [CCMA]; Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA). For further 
reflection: Christie C & Bradfield D “Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa” 6thed (2011) 406-417. 
51 On the other hand, the reciprocal duties of an employee under the common law are, duty to provide service, duty 
of subordination, duty of good faith and duty competency and efficiency. 
52 Liberty Life Association of Africa v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC); Smit v Workmen’s Compensation 
Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
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performs work or services under the supervision and control of another in exchange for 
remuneration or reward on such terms and conditions as agreed upon by the parties. However, it 
must be noted that not everyone who works is an employee under a contract of employment. One 
unique category is that of independent contractors who work under a contract of work. Mischke53 
defines an independent contractor as a person who is hired by another to do a specific task, with 
the person letting out the work being the principal and the one doing the work being the agent. He 
or she undertakes to produce a result within a specified period.54 
 
2.5 THE COMMON LAW TESTS 
In an attempt to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor the common law 
developed a number of tests. These tests as noted by Benjamin55 were formulated by courts as they 
sought for “a single definitive touchstone to identify the employment relationship”. The tests 
include the following, the control test, organisation test, economic realities test and the dominant 
impression test. As shall be demonstrated herein below the approach followed by South African 
courts in developing these tests closely resemble that of the English courts. 
 
2.5.1 The Control Test 
This test is premised on the principle that the employer’s right of control with regard to the work 
which has to be done by an employee, when it is to be done and the manner in which it has to be 
done, is the sole determining factor of the existence of an employment relationship.56 Early English 
law cases adopted this test when dealing with vicarious liability of an employer for the delicts 
committed by an employee. Only a worker who was subject to the supervision and control of his 
master could render his or her employer vicariously liable for unlawful acts committed in the scope 
of employment. The basis of liability was the employer’s ability to supervise and control an 
employee.57 South African courts first applied this test in Colonial Mutual Life Association v 
                                                 
53 Mischke C in Basson AC et al Essential Labour Law (2002) at 27. 
54 Opperman v Research Surveys (Pty) Ltd (1997) 6 BLLR 807 (CCMA); Borcheds v CW Pearce and F Sheward t/a 
Lubrite Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC); R v AMCA Services Ltd 1959 (4) SA 207 (A).  
55 Benjamin P, “An accident of history” at 787. 
56 Yewens v Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530 and Selwyn N Selwyn,s Law of Employment (2011) at 47-48. 
57 Rycroft A and Jordaan B A Guide to South African labour law (1992) at 41. 
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McDonald58 in which it was held that due to the absence of the right to control and supervise an 
insurance agent, Colonial Mutual was not vicariously liable for his negligence.59 
 
Unfortunately, the major drawback of this test was that it was based on control as the sole 
determining factor for the existence of a contract of employment and nothing else. It failed to cope 
with the emergence of semi and highly skilled professionals who had significant latitude to 
determine the work they had to do and how they had to do it. Le Roux60 also criticised this test on 
the basis of its limited scope since it was developed within the context of vicarious liability under 
the law of delict and not employment law. Grogan61 takes the argument further and posits that to 
prescribe a contract of employment on the basis of control alone is pleonastic since control is a 
consequence of a contract of employment. Furthermore, it was too wide and difficult to measure 
the degree of control sufficient to qualify one as an employee or not. Though authorities are in 
agreement that control is not the sole determining factor they acknowledge that it is relevant as 
one of the factors which a court must take into account in distinguishing a contract of employment 
from that of an independent contractor.62 The control test met its waterloo in the mid 1970’s in the 
case of Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekerings Genootskap Avbob.63 
 
2.5.2 Organisation/ Integration Test 
This test was first developed in English law by Kahn-Freund64 in an effort to address the 
inadequacies of the control test. The test identifies an employee by questioning if that individual 
is part of the employer’s organisation. Lord Denning in the English case of Stevenson, Jordan and 
Harrison Ltd v McDonald and Evans,65 described the test in the following words,  
“One feature which seems to run through the instances is that under a contract of service, a man is 
employed as part of the business, and his work is done as an integral part of the business, whereas 
under a contract for services, his work, although done for the business is not integrated into it but 
is only accessory to it.” 
                                                 
58 1931 AD 412. 
59 See R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T); R v AMCA Services Ltd 1954 (4) SA 208 (A). 
60 Le Roux R “The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in South Africa” (2010) 39 ILJ 139 at 149. 
61 Grogan J Workplace Law (2011) at 17-18. 
62 See J and JN Freeze Trust v The Statutory Council for the Squid and Related Fisheries of South Africa (2011) 32 
ILJ 2966 (LC); Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd (2000) 5 LLD 457 (LC). 
63 1976 (4) SA 446 (A). 
64 Kahn-Freund O, ‘A note on Status and Contract in British law’ (1951) 14 Modern LR 504. 
65 [1952] 1 TLR 101 at 11. 
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In South Africa it was adopted in the case of R v AMCA66 as an experimental test in response to 
the deficiencies of the control test. In England it was rejected in Ready Mix Concrete (South East) 
v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance67 followed by a similar disapproval in South Africa 
in S v AMCA Services68 on the basis that it begged more questions than it answered and failed to 
shed any light on the legal nature of the integration. It was difficult to gauge one’s degree of 
integration in an organisation. It was held to be vague, nebulous and of no useful assistance, it 
presented more problems than solutions.69 Despite its apparent shortcomings, integration in the 
employers’ organisation still remains one of the relevant criteria indicating the existence of an 
employment relationship.70 
 
2.5.3 Economic Realities Test 
This test was developed in the English case of Montreal v Montreal Locomotive Works71 in which 
it was held that the main question to be asked was whether “one is in business on his own” or 
“whose business it is?” The test raises the following questions; does the person provide his own 
equipment? Does he hire his own assistants? Who takes financial risk? Does he pay taxes? Is he 
paid a wage or commission? And whether he can delegate work? The million dollar question is 
whether one is economically dependent on the employer or self-employed?72 This test was 
designed to address the shortcomings which were inherent in the control test but also proved to be 
unsatisfactory. South African courts never adopted this test. They simply acknowledged that 
economic dependence was one of the three primary criteria which a court had to look at in 
identifying an employee from an independent contractor.73 
 
2.5.4 Dominant Impression Test (DIT) 
This test was developed by English courts in the case of Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of 
Pensions74 in which it was held that no single factor was determinative of the employment 
                                                 
66 1954 (4) SA 208 (A). 
67 (1968) 2 QB 497. 
68 1962 (4) SA 537(A). 
69 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 SA 51 (A). 
70 See Kambule v CCMA [2013] 7 BLLR 682 (LC); NEHAWU v Ramodise (2010) 31 ILJ 695 (LC). 
71 [1947] 1 DLR 161; Market Investigators Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1968] 3 All ER 732; Lithers v 
Flackwell Health Football Supporters Club [1981] 1 RLR 307 EAT.  
72 Grogan J Workplace Law (2011) at 21. 
73 See SITA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC); NEHAWU v Ramodise (2010) 31 ILJ 695 (LC). 
74 (1968) 2 QB 497. 
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relationship and all relevant circumstances had to be considered. South African courts follow 
suited the English courts. The DIT was developed as a hybrid test in terms of which the approach 
was to look at the relationship as a whole and then draw a conclusion from the entire picture. The 
test was then reaffirmed in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation75 in which factors characteristic of 
an employment contract and a contract of work were identified.76 The scheme underlying the test 
is to consider indicia tending to portray the existence of a contract of employment as opposed to 
those signalling an independent contractor. The main factors identified by the South African 
courts77 include among others: The right to supervise and control, extent to which employee 
depends on employer for the performance of his or her work, whether the employee is allowed to 
work for other persons, whether he has to perform his duties personally, whether the employee is 
allowed to delegate or perform tasks through others, whether he is paid by commission or a wage, 
whether he provides his own tools, right to discipline the worker and terminate contract and 
whether the employee is integrated into the organisation. The list of relevant factors is non 
exhaustive. 
 
Though the DIT has been accepted as the standard test, it is without its critics.  The theme 
underlying the test is that no single factor can conclusively indicate the existence of a contract of 
employment. It is this principle which has been identified by several authors as its chief drawback. 
As early as 1980 the test was under attack. Mureinik78 lampooned the test in the following words, 
“to say that an employment contract is a contract which looks like one of employment sheds no 
light whatsoever on the “legal nature” of the relationship between a master and his servant.” The 
same sentiments were echoed by Brassey.79 The criticism did not end there, Benjamin80 noted that 
the test provided no guidelines on what weight should be attached to the individual factors and it 
is difficult to gauge the importance of each factor.  
 
                                                 
75 1979 SA 51 (A). 
76 These factors were also restated in SABC v McKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 (LAC). 
77 See also Borcheds v C W Pearce and J Sherward t/a Lubrite Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC); Board 
Executors Ltd v McCafferty (1997) 18 ILJ 949 (LAC). 
78 Mureinik E “The Contract of Service: An Easy Test for Hard Cases” (1980) 97 SALJ 246 at 258. 
79 Brassey M “The Nature of Employment” (1990) 11 ILJ 889 at 919. 
80 Benjamin P “An accident of history” at 789. 
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Admittedly, the DIT discombobulates similar problems as all the other tests in that it describes 
consequences of a contract of employment rather than the causal indications thereof.81 The test 
merely relies on the common law characteristics of employment and nothing else. Indeed it is 
nothing more than merely a shorthand of saying the decision must be taken in light of all relevant 
factors. Courts have also noted the inadequacies inherent in this test. Zondo AJ in Medical 
Association of South Africa v Minister of Health82 berated the test for its unsatisfactory results and 
uncertainty. He held that some of the factors taken into account are of little value in distinguishing 
an employee from an independent contractor and do not offer any guidance.83 Despite severe 
criticism from legal writers and the courts, the common law has failed to evolve and respond. The 
DIT is still the favoured standard test employed by the courts to distinguish an employee from an 
independent contractor.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Identifying the elusive employee under the common law has not always been easy. Several tests 
were developed by the courts but these tests never produced satisfactory results. The preferred DIT 
has struggled to adequately capture the diversity of the modern labour market. Inconsistencies in 
its application has led to the development of an incoherent jurisprudence in distinguishing an 
employee from an independent contractor. Admittedly, the courts have failed to come up with a 
lasting solution to labour law’s perennial problem hence the need for statutory intervention. Thus, 
the thesis now turns to the various ways in which the legislature has intervened in identifying the 
elusive employee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Le Roux R and Jordaan B, “Contract of Employment,” Thompson W & Benjamin P 1965 E1-8, 2009. 
82 (1997) 18 ILJ 528. 
83 See also De Greeve/ Old Mutual Employee Benefits/ Life Assurance Co. (SA) Ltd [2004] 2 BALR 184 (CCMA); 
Apsey v Babcock Engineering [1995] 5 BLLR 17 (10). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STATUTORY AND INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The intervention by the legislature in the realm of labour law was three pronged. Firstly, it created 
fundamental rights of employees by providing minimum conditions of employment which parties 
to an employment relationship cannot contract below. Secondly, the state guaranteed the rights to 
collective bargaining and collective job action. Lastly, specialised dispute resolution forums to 
deal with labour matters were created. Over and above these interventions, the legislature 
identified and defined employees as the only beneficiaries of the rights guaranteed by labour 
legislation and litigants who could access dispute resolution mechanisms established by these 
statutes. It is therefore necessary to investigate the definition ascribed to an employee in previous 
statutes and the manner in which the courts interpreted such definition before reviewing the current 
statutory framework. This is so since the current debate owes its origins to the interpretation of the 
definition in early industrial relations legislation. 
 
3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 
In the early twentieth century labour law underwent notable changes which laid the foundation of 
today’s statutory framework. The first legislation in South Africa to define the term employee was 
the Transvaal Industrial Disputes Prevention Act No. 20 of 1909. This Act was territorial and only 
applied to the Transvaal. It was followed by the first detailed national labour legislation, the ICA 
No. 11 of 1924.84 The definition was a mirror reflection of the 1909 Act. Early definitions of 
employee did not exclude independent contractors. Exclusions were based on race and form of 
work. In 1937 the ICA of 1924 was finally repealed by the ICA No. 36 of 1937.85 The definition 
                                                 
84 It defined an employee in section 24 as; 
“any person engaged by an employer to perform, for hire or reward, manual, clerical, or supervision work 
in any undertaking, industry, trade or occupation to which this Act applies, but shall not include a person 
whose contract of service or labour is regulated by any Native Pass Laws and Regulations.” 
 
85 An employee was defined in section 1 of this Act as; 
“any person employed by, or working for any employer, and receiving, or being entitled to receive, any 
remuneration, and any other person whatsoever who in any manner assists in the carrying on or conducting 
of the business of the employer but does not include a person, whose contract of service or labour is 
regulated by any Native Pass Laws.” 
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of employee in section 1 of the ICA of 1937 was amended by section 36 of the Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act No. 48 of 1953.86 It was followed by the ICA 28 of 1956 which was 
later renamed LRA 28 of 1956. The definition of employee in section 1 of the LRA, 1956 was a 
replica of the 1937 Act and the only difference with earlier legislation was that these Acts now 
included a reference to persons assisting an employer. However, the dual industrial system 
premised on racial segregation involving political, economic and legal discrimination against 
people who were not white was maintained.87 
 
Another notable development during this period was the reference by the courts to the common 
law contract of employment by implication as they interpreted the statutory definition. An 
employee though not defined in terms of contract was being contrasted with an independent 
contractor. This development started in the early 1930’s when courts relied on the control test in 
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.88 This resulted in the development of 
an incoherent jurisprudence on the interpretation of the statutory definition of employee as 
illustrated in Chapter 2. In 1979 the government appointed Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into 
Labour Legislation recommended various reforms that changed South African labour law 
landscape. Through section 1 (c) of the ICAA 94 of 1979, as amended by section 1 (f) of the LRAA 
57 of 1981 and section 1 (a) of the LRAA 2 of 1983, the definition of an employee by reference to 
race was abolished.89 This period coincided with the introduction of a specialist IC and the 
development of unfair labour practices jurisprudence. These developments, as acknowledged by 
Le Roux,90 resulted in an upsurge in workers suing under labour legislation. This in turn led to the 
IC being often called to decide on whether one was an employee or not before assuming 
jurisdiction. In distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor the courts relied on the 
DIT. It was by application of this test that the courts played a significant role in instilling the 
common law employee-independent contractor duality into labour legislation by implication.91 
                                                 
86 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (2006) at 8. 
87 Le Roux R “The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in South Africa” (2010) 39 ILJ 139 at 161. 
88 R v Chaplin 1931 OPD 172; Colonial Mutual Life Assurance v MacDonald 1931 AD 412; R v AMCA Services 
1954 (4) SA 208 (A); R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T). 
89 Section 1 (a) of the 1983 Amendment Act defined an employee as; 
“any person who is employed by or working for an employer and receiving or entitled to receive any 
remuneration, and, subject to subsection (3), any other person whomsoever who in any manner assists in 
the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer.” 
90 Le Roux R “The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in South Africa” (2010) 39 ILJ 139 at 163. 
91 Le Roux R supra at 163.  
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Through this approach courts inherited the inadequacies inherent in the common law tests 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
As a result of the shortcomings apparent in early legislation which owed its origins to apartheid, a 
new dispensation was ushered 1994. It started with an interim Constitution, which guaranteed 
labour rights. This was followed by the enactment of the current LRA which was complemented 
by the BCEA, EEA and the SDA. The 21st century brought with it several amendments to the LRA 
and the BCEA. In 2006, the Code was also introduced. The current legislative framework is 
constituted by these statutes and they are the subject of the next discussion. 
 
3.3 IDENTIFYING THE ELUSIVE EMPLOYEE 
3.3.1 Definition of Employee under the LRA, 66 of 1995 
The LRA, 1995 applies to all employees in the private sector and public sector. Excluded from its 
application are members of the National Defence Force, members of the State Security Agency 
and South African Secret Service.92 Section 213 of the LRA defines an employee as  
“(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the state 
and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration, and  
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer,  
and “employed” and “employment” have meanings corresponding to that of employee.”93 
Though substantially similar with the 1956 LRA definition, the LRA, 1995 specifically excludes 
independent contractors.  
 
3.3.2 Interpreting the definition of employee 
3.3.2.1 Part (a) of the definition 
The statutory definition of employee consists two parts, part (a) and part (b). Le Roux94 states that 
the first part of the definition has three requirements, namely, a person who works for another 
person, the person is not an independent contractor and receives or is entitled to receive 
remuneration. The definition does not differentiate the diverse categories of employees such as 
                                                 
92 See section 2 of the LRA, section 3 (1) of the BCEA, section 4 (3) of the EEA and the SDA. 
93 A similar definition is also found in sections 1 of the BCEA, EEA and the SDA.  
94 Le Roux R, “The Regulation of Work, Wither the Contract of Employment? An Analysis of the Suitability of the 
Contract of Employment to Regulate the Different Forms of Labour Market Participation by Individual Workers”, 
Unpublished Phd Thesis, UCT, 2008 at 195. 
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part time, full time or permanent, casual, fixed term or probationary employees. Benjamin95 posits 
that the terminology of contract is introduced through the exclusion of independent contractors in 
part (a) of the definition. However, it must be noted that this exclusion was introduced by the 
courts during the 1930,s when interpreting early industrial legislation. Part (a) also excludes 
persons performing work for which they do not receive, or are entitled to receive remuneration 
from the definition.96 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that volunteer workers who undertake work without remuneration 
are not employees as defined by the LRA.97 Also excluded from the definition are students 
undergoing vocational training and students on attachment. The work they undertake is for 
educational purposes and not in exchange for remuneration. However, it must be noted that in 
terms of section 3 (2) of the BCEA, the Act applies to persons undergoing vocational training. 
Despite the fact that they are not employees they are protected in respect of conditions of work. 
The definition also excludes from its application family members of the employer performing 
unpaid work in the employer’s business.98 Part (a) of the definition also excludes members of the 
clergy.99 Due to the spiritual nature of their work there is no contractual intention such that they 
are not employees.100 Courts have also extended the scope of the statutory exclusions to include 
magistrates, judges,101 presidential appointments, parliamentarians, 102 ministerial appointments 
and members of statutory boards.103 It can therefore be concluded that part (a) of the definition is 
premised on the common law contract of employment and the common law requirements discussed 
in Chapter 2 must be satisfied for the existence of an employment relationship. Despite this 
position, the definition does not use the language of contract or define a contract of employment. 
                                                 
95 Benjamin P “An accident of history” at 789. 
96 Sections 213 of the LRA and 1 of the BCEA define the term remuneration. 
97 See section 3 (1) (b) of the BCEA; Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO [1999] 7 BLLR 698 
(LC). 
98 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (2006) at 73. 
99 See Church of the Province of Southern Africa Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA (2001) 22 ILJ 2274 (LC); 
Schreuder v NGK, Wilgespruit (1999) 20 ILJ 1936 (LC); Salvation Army (South African Territory) v Minister of 
Labour [2004] 12 BLLR 1264 (LC). 
100 Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v Myeni, Mxolosi Justice [2014] 3 BLLR 295 (LC). 
101 See Hannah v Government of the Republic of Namibia [2000] (4) SA 940 (NMLC); President of South Africa v 
Reineck (2014) 35 ILJ 1485 (SCA); Van Eck and Diedericks, “Are Magistrates without Remedy in Terms of Labour 
Law? (2014) 33 ILJ 111.  
102 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa v Charlton [2010] 10 BLLR 1024 (LAC). 
103 Van Zyl v WCPA C Department of Transport and Public Works (2004) 25 ILJ 2060 (CCMA). 
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3.3.2.2 Part (b) of the definition 
Prima facie it can be argued that part (b) includes everyone who works including independent 
contractors, volunteers, clergy, judges, and magistrates’ members of the security services in the 
definition of employee. However, to adopt a literal interpretation would result in absurdity.104 To 
avoid this fatuity, courts have held that  part (a) must be read conjuctively with part (b) and by 
applying the DIT to determine the existence or otherwise of an employment relationship.105 The 
second part is not circumscribed by the requirement of remuneration and is preceded by the 
statement “and any other person”. Le Roux106 submits that the “other person” relates to a person 
other than the one referred to in the first part of the definition. Since part (a) and part (b) must be 
read together, part (b) covers a person, excluding an independent contractor who assists the 
employer. In Borcheds v CW Pearce and F Sherwood t/a Lubrite Distributors,107 the requirements 
a person assisting in conducting the business of an employer must satisfy to qualify as an employee 
were stated as: the person must not perform work or services which have the effect of providing 
assistance but assist in the carrying on or conducting of a business, assistance should be rendered 
regularly, there must be a legal obligation to render such assistance arising ex contractu or ex lege, 
and assistance should not be at the will and at the sole discretion of the one assisting.108 Since a 
person who does not receive or is entitled to remuneration is not explicitly excluded under part (b) 
it is accepted that this is an indication that the definition is not necessarily rooted in the common 
law contract of employment or the conclusion of a valid and enforceable contract.109 The focus 
shifts from the existence of a contract of employment to the existence of an employment 
relationship which is established by reference to the common law criteria under the DIT.110 On 
this basis, courts have had to look at the realities of the relationship as opposed to the label given 
to it by the parties. This has resulted in workers without contracts of employment being held to be 
                                                 
104 Liberty Life Association of Africa v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC). 
105 Van Niekerk A et al Law @ Work (2015) at 63.  
106 Le Roux R, “The Regulation of Work, Wither the Contract of Employment? An Analysis of the Suitability of the 
Contract of Employment to Regulate the Different Forms of Labour Market Participation by Individual Workers” 
Unpublished Phd Thesis, UCT, 2008 at 197.  
107 (1991) 12 ILJ 383 (IC); Oak Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO (1987) 8 ILJ 756 (N); Niselow v Liberty Life 
Association of Africa Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 752 (SCA). 
108 Conradie M, A critical analysis of the right to fair labour practices; Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Free 
State, 2013 at 112. 
109 Vettori S, “The Extension of Labour Legislation Protection and illegal Immigrants”, (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ at 
825-828.  
110  Van Niekerk A, “Personal Service Companies and the Definition of “Employee”, (2005) 26 ILJ 1909 at 1909. 
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employees for purposes of the LRA. But one might ask, why interpret the definition of employee 
widely and focus on existence of an employment relationship? How can an employment 
relationship be identified? Why the definition is not necessarily rooted in the common law 
contract? The jurisprudential basis for answers to these questions requires further contemplation 
and is discussed herein below.  
 
3.3.3. The Constitutional Perspective 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and guarantees labour rights in section 23.111 One 
of the primary objects of the LRA is to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred 
by the Constitution.112 Furthermore, section 3 (a) and (b) of the LRA demand that its provisions 
be interpreted so as to give effect to its primary objects and in compliance with the Constitution. 
Thus, the definition of employee must be interpreted and considered against the backdrop of the 
Constitution. Section 23 of the Constitution does not identify employees as bearers of the right but 
identifies workers, employees, trade unions and employer organisations. Relevant to this 
discussion is the identity of “everyone” and “workers” and their impact on the definition of 
employee. Cheadle113 argues that the term “everyone” must be construed with reference to 
“labour practices.” He states that; 
“Although the right to fair labour practices in subsection (1) appears to be accorded 
everyone, the boundaries of the right are circumscribed by the reference in subsection (1) 
to “labour practices.” The focus of enquiry into ambit should not be on the use of 
“everyone” but on the reference to “labour practices.” Labour practices are the practices 
that arise from the relationship between workers, employers and their respective 
organisations. Accordingly, the right to fair labour practices ought not to be read as 
extending the class of persons beyond those classes envisaged by the section as a whole.”114 
Thus, reference to everyone under section 23 (1) does not extend to cover parties outside the 
employment relationship but is restricted to the beneficiaries of the right under section 23.115 Who 
then are “workers”? 
 
                                                 
111 Section 23 (1) of the Constitution states as follows, “Everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. 
112 Section 1 of the LRA, 1995. 
113 Cheadle H “Labour Relations,” in Cheadle et al, South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2006). 
114 Authorities are in agreement that this is the correct definition of everyone. See Chaskalson M et al Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (1996); Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) at 490 – 520; Du Toit and 
Potgieter M Labour Relations in the Bill of Rights in Bill of Rights Compedium (Service Issue 21 Oct 2002). 
115 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC). 
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Happily the superior courts have already dealt with the question in more ways than one. The 
discussion begins with the decision in SANDU.116 This case dealt with the right of members of the 
South African defence force to join trade unions. Though Section 2 (a) of the LRA excludes 
members of the National Defence Force from application of the Act, section 23 (2) (a) of the 
Constitution guarantees every worker the right to form and join a trade union. The question for 
determination was whether soldiers were workers for purposes of section 23 (2) (a) of the 
Constitution despite the statutory exclusion in the LRA? In holding that soldiers were workers for 
purposes of Section 23(2), “O” Regan J stated that;  
“Clearly, members of armed forces render service for which they receive a range of benefits. On 
the other hand, their enrolment in the permanent force imposes upon them an obligation to comply 
with the rules of the Military Disciplinary Code. A breach of that obligation of compliance 
constitutes a criminal offence. In many respects, therefore, the relationship between members of 
the permanent force and the defence force is akin to an employment relationship.” 
The court concluded that, though the relationship between soldiers and the National Defence Force 
was sui generis, it was “akin to an employment relationship”. On this basis soldiers were held to 
be workers for purposes of Section 23 (2). But when is a relationship “akin to an employment 
relationship”? Whilst the authority set out above is helpful in identifying who is a worker it does 
not define when a relationship is akin to an employment relationship. Therefore there is need to 
make reference to a further authority which is the judgment of SITA v CCMA.117 In identifying the 
employer Davis JA reasoned that emphasis was not on the existence of a contract of employment 
but an employment relationship.  Though the term employment relationship was not defined it was 
held that it must be established by reference to three primary criteria namely; the employer’s right 
to supervision and control, whether the employee is integrated into the organisation and economic 
dependence of employee on employer.118 
 
In principle courts have gone back to the common law criteria under the DIT so as to identify an 
employment relationship. It is accepted that labour law presents itself in new and diverse forms 
such that reliance on the traditional contract of employment will render labour law less relevant.119 
Thus, given that the employment relationship is a relationship of inequality there is need to 
                                                 
116 (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC).  
117 (2008) 7 BLLR 611 (LAC). 
118 See also Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC); NEHAWU v Ramodise (2010) 31 ILJ 695 (LC); J 
and J N Freeze Trust v The Statutory Council for the Squid and Related Fisheries of SA (2011) 32 ILJ 2966 (LC). 
119 Le Roux R, The Meaning of “Workers” and the Road towards Diversification, Reflecting on Discovery, SITA and 
Kylie (2009) 30 ILJ 49. 
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countervail the exercise of employer power and promotion of labour market activities. This can 
only be achieved by protecting vulnerable and marginalised workers who participate in diverse 
and unpredictable forms of employment. The Constitution does this by using the term “worker” 
and not the narrow term “employee.” This demands a generous and purposive interpretation of the 
definition of employee capable of accommodating various forms of employment and is not 
circumscribed by the common law contract of employment.120 Emphasis should be on the 
existence of an employment relationship as opposed to the existence of a valid contract of 
employment. The impact of the Constitution can be illustrated in cases of employees’ in utero and 
illegal employees discussed herein below. 
 
3.3.3.1 Employees in utero 
Labour legislation is silent on when one becomes an employee for purposes of statutory 
protections.  Once upon a time authorities were in agreement that a person would only become an 
employee if that person rendered services for which he was entitled to remuneration.121 This 
position was reversed in the case of Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Mangele.122 The question for 
determination was whether protections of the LRA were available to a person whose contract of 
employment is terminated prior to the commencement of employment. The court held that since 
section 23(1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to fair labour practices, there was 
need to interpret the definition of employee purposively. The court concluded that, 
 “The definition of employee in S213 of the LRA can be read to include a person or persons who 
have or have concluded a contract or contracts of employment the commencement of which is or 
one deferred to a future date or dates.”123 
In any event, under the common law a contract of employment comes into existence where there 
is acceptance of an offer of employment.124 It is only when the offer of is conditional that an 
employment relationship comes into existence on fulfilment of such condition. In light of the 
foregoing it can be concluded that, an employment relationship comes into existence on acceptance 
of an offer of employment unless the offer is conditional. 
                                                 
120 Le Roux R, “The Worker: Towards Labour Laws New Vocabulary” (2007) 124 SALJ 469 at 472-3. 
121 See Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd [1999] 8 BLLR 862 (LC); Jack v Director General Department of 
Environmental Affairs (2003) BLLR 28 (LC). 
122 [2005] 6 BLLR 523 (LAC). 
123 Bayat v Durban Institute of Technology (2006) 27 ILJ 188 (CCMA). 
124 See Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC). 
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3.3.3.2 Illegal Employees 
Illegality of a contract of employment can arise from two scenarios. Firstly it can arise from the 
status of the parties to the employment contract, for instance, a foreigner performing work without 
the relevant work permit. Secondly, it can arise from the performance of prohibited work or 
conduct which would attract criminal sanctions such as prostitution. Traditionally, in the absence 
of valid contract of employment one is not entitled to protections given by labour legislation.125 
Inspired by international labour standards, the constitutional right to fair labour practices and the 
vulnerability of illegal workers, courts in 2008 accepted illegal workers as employees.126 
Significant changes to the law started in the case of Discovery Health v CCMA127 followed by 
Kylie v CCMA.128 The Discovery case involved a foreigner, who was employed without a work 
permit in contravention of the Immigration Act 2 of 2002. Having realised that Lanzetta had no 
work permit the employer dismissed him. Aggrieved by the decision Lanzetta approached the 
CCMA which declined jurisdiction and then the LC on review. The LC held that the contract of 
employment was not invalid. It was not the intention of the Immigration Act to render the 
employee’s contract null and void but to penalise the employer who employed a foreigner without 
a work permit. Otherwise rendering such contracts void would encourage exploitation of illegal 
migrants by unscrupulous employers in contravention of international labour standards on migrant 
workers. Secondly, the court motivated by section 23 of the Constitution held that even if the 
contract was invalid the statutory definition of employee does not necessarily presuppose a valid 
contract of employment. It is wide enough to cover illegal migrant workers. Without having to 
establish the existence of an employment relationship the court concluded that any person who 
renders his services for remuneration on a basis other than that recognised as employment by the 
common law may be an employee for purposes of the statutory definition. The same reasoning 
was followed in Kylie case in which a sex worker claimed unfair dismissal. Despite the prohibition 
of prostitution under the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 the court concluded that on the basis of 
the constitutional guarantee of labour rights, Kylie was in an employment relationship 
                                                 
125 See Dube v Classique Panel Beaters [1997] 7 BLLR 868 (IC); Vudhla v Millies Fashions (2003) 24 ILJ 142 
(CCMA); Georgiva- Degonova v Graighall Spar (2004) 4 BALR 1143 (CCMA). 
126 This acceptance was initially advocated by Bosch C in “Can unauthorized workers be regarded as employees for 
purposes of the LRA? (2006) 27 ILJ 1342. 
127  [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC). See also Ndikumdavyi v Vlakenberg Hospital (2012) 33 ILJ 2648 (LC). 
128 [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC). 
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notwithstanding the non-existence of a valid contract of employment.129 These two cases clearly 
illustrate that labour legislation must be interpreted purposively with the aim being that of applying 
the interpretation that best gives effect to the Constitution.130 While the employment contract 
signifies the birth of an employment relationship, its existence is no longer sine qua non of 
protection afforded by labour legislation. 
 
Against this background the LRAA 6 of 2014 removed the words “contract of employment” from 
the definition of “Dismissal” in Section 186 of the LRA. Van Niekerk131 submits that the 
amendment sought to clarify that termination of employment is dismissal, whether or not there is 
a formal or written contract of employment. It removed the doubt raised by the old section 186 
which defined dismissal on the basis of a contract of employment. The amendment is also a clear 
indication that emphasis is now on the existence of an employment relationship rather than a valid 
contract of employment. Instead of relying on the constitutional right to fair labour practices illegal 
employees can now base their causa on section 186 (1) of the LRA.  
 
3.4 DISTINGUISHING AN EMPLOYEE FROM AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
UNDER THE LRA 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that courts developed a number of tests and during the 1970’s they settled 
for the DIT. In the early 2000’s this test was modified as focus shifted to the existence of an 
employment relationship rather than the contract of employment and three primary criteria 
indicative of an employment relationship were identified. Unfortunately the tests struggled to 
adequately capture the diversity of the labour market and the rise in atypical and disguised forms 
of employment. In response to these challenges the legislature enacted sections 200A of the LRA 
and 83A of the BCEA. In addition, NEDLAC also issued the Code. These policy measures were 
aimed at complementing DIT and assisting the courts in identifying the elusive employee. These 
measures are discussed in detail herein below.  
 
                                                 
129 See generally Vettori S “The Extension of Labour Legislation Protection to Illegal Immigrants” (2009) 21 SA 
Merc LJ at 818-830; Grogan J “The wages of sin: Labour law in the sex industry” (2010) 26 (4) Employment law 1; 
Muswaka L “Sex Workers and the Right to Fair Labour Practices: Kylie v CCMA” (2011) 23 (3) SA Merc LJ 533.   
130NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC); NEHAWU v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 95 
(CC). 
131 Van Nierkerk A et al Law @ work (2015) at 61. 
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3.4.1 The presumption of employment 
Section 200A (1) of the LRA introduced a rebuttable presumption as to who is an employee and 
provides as follows132; 
“(1) Until the contrary is proved, for the purposes of this Act, any employment law and section 
98A of the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936) a person who works for, or renders services 
to, any other person is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an employee, if any 
one or more of the following factors are present:133 
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person,  
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person  
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organisation,  
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over 
the last three months 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or renders 
services,  
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person, or  
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
 
The presumption builds on existing jurisprudence developed by the courts and does not amend or 
widen the scope of the definition of employee. As submitted by A van Niekerk et al134 it is an 
“evidentiary device calculated to switch the onus of proof of employment” in circumstances where 
any one of the seven factors listed is established. If a person alleging to be an employee proves the 
existence of any one of the factors the presumption is triggered. That person is presumed an 
employee and the onus shifts to the alleged employer who must now rebut the presumption on a 
balance of probabilities. The criteria under section 200A (1) (a) – (g) is a codification of the 
common law indicators under the DIT. Thus, in applying the presumption, the nature of the 
relationship must be considered in its entirety so as to assess whether parties in fact entered into 
an employment relationship.135 
 
The main purpose of the presumption is to assist vulnerable workers who were either unable to 
assert their rights as employees or were classified as independent contractors despite their 
dependence on persons to whom they provided their services. It is aimed at combating disguised 
employment by demanding a purposive interpretation of the definition of employee.136 In 
                                                 
132 See section 83A of the BCEA. 
133 Though the presumption is not found in other labour legislation and social security legislation it is submitted that 
by the use of the words “any employment law” it can still be invoked in identifying who is an employee under such 
legislation. 
134 Van Niekerk A et al Law @ Work (2015) at 64. 
135 Van Zyl v WCPA Department of Transport (2004) 25 ILJ 2060. 
136 See Explanatory Memorandum to Draft Bill 2000 published in (2000) 21 ILJ 2195.  
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recognition of this objective, the presumption does not apply to persons earning more than R205 
433, 30 per annum137 but to low income workers who are economically vulnerable.138 Despite this 
assertion, it is submitted that there is no basis for distinguishing the nature of the relationship 
between the parties exclusively on the basis of income. The mere fact that a worker earns in excess 
of the threshold should not act as a bar for the applicability of the presumption.  
 
In terms of section 200A (1) of the LRA the presumption applies “regardless of the form of 
contract.” By use of these words, the legislature confirmed that the statutory definition of 
employee extends beyond the common law contract of employment.139 However this interpretation 
came under scrutiny in Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v Myeni Mxolisi Justice140 which 
involved a pastor who alleged unfair dismissal. The LAC was called to interpret the meaning of 
the words “regardless of the form of the contract” and determine whether section 200A is 
applicable only where there is a contract or contractual arrangement between parties. The court 
concluded that section 200A required that there must be a legally enforceable agreement or some 
contractual working arrangement in place between the parties, for it to apply.  By the use of the 
words “regardless of the form of contract”, it simply means that a contract does not have to be 
formal or in writing. The court then went on to rule that since on the facts the parties never intended 
to engage in any form of a legally binding agreement, including an employment contract, section 
200A was not applicable to Myeni and for that reason, no employer - employee relationship 
existed. Thus, the appeal was upheld and the award of the CCMA set aside on the basis that it did 
not have the requisite jurisdiction. 
 
It is submitted that the LAC adopted a restricted interpretation of section 200A. Emphasis on the 
term “contract” in section 200A negates earlier assertions that the statutory definition of an 
employee in labour legislation does not presuppose the existence of a valid and binding contract. 
Use of the word “contract” does not refer to a common law contract but a “work arrangement” 
as envisaged in sections 200A (3) of the LRA and 83A (3) of the BCEA. Applicability of section 
                                                 
137 See section 200A (2) of the LRA. 
138 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (2006) at 80. 
139 Theron J, The Shift to Services and Triangular Employment: Implications for Labour Market Reform 2008 ILJ 1-
21; Van Niekerk A et al Law @ Work (2015) at 64. 
140 Unreported LAC Durban, DA 3/14 delivered on 28th July 2015. 
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200A must be dependent on the existence of an employment relationship or a work arrangement 
and not existence of a valid and enforceable contract. To hold otherwise would clearly limit the 
scope of application of the presumption thereby defeating its purpose. 
 
3.4.2 Code of Good Practice: Who Is an Employee? 
The interpretive framework of the statutory definition of an employee is incomplete without 
reference to the Code issued by NEDLAC in terms of section 200A (4) read with section 203 of 
the LRA.141 In terms of these provisions any person interpreting or applying labour legislation 
must take into account the Code in determining whether one is an employee or not. The Code is 
aimed at providing certainty and clarity as to who is an employee. Furthermore, it assists persons 
applying and interpreting labour law to understand and interpret the various forms of employment 
in the labour market including disguised employment, ambiguous employment relationships, 
atypical employment and triangular employment relationships. In doing so, it ensures that a proper 
distinction is maintained between employment and independent contracting. It seeks to give effect 
to South Africa’s obligations under ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation 198 of 2006 
as well as setting out the interpretive principles contained in the Constitution. 
 
As for the substantive contents of the Code, part 2 explains in detail the operation of the rebuttable 
presumption of employment and the seven indicators of employment are explained. Part 3 of the 
Code deals with guidelines on interpretation of the definition of employee in principal labour 
legislation whilst social security legislation is covered in Part 10. The other provisions relate to 
disguised and atypical employment relationships and principles of interpretation applicable to 
section 200A of the LRA and the definition of an employee. The Code does not amend the 
definition but is a guideline on interpreting it and section 200A of the LRA. As noted by Cheadle 
AJ142 the Code cements the modern trend that focus is now on the nature of the employment 
relationship rather than its contractual form. The language of the Code implores on courts to look 
at the realities of the relationship between the parties since the contractual relationship may not 
always reflect the true relationship. 
 
                                                 
141 The Code is published at (2007) 28 ILJ 96.  
142Kylie v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 198 (LC). 
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3.5 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 
International law is the yardstick for evaluating domestic legislation.143 The South African 
Constitution recognises the relevance of customary international law as a source of law in sections 
232, 233 and 39 (1) (b).144 Relevant to labour law are international labour standards made under 
the auspices of ILO. Principal labour legislation recognises the supremacy of ILO standards. 
Sections 1 and 3 of the LRA clearly state that the purpose of the Act is to give effect to obligations 
incurred by South Africa as a member state of ILO and that the Act must be interpreted in 
compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.145 The Code in Part 3 
also demands that in interpreting the presumption of employment or definition of an employee 
such provisions must be interpreted in compliance with international labour standards. Therefore, 
ILO standards are important points of reference and it’s necessary that those which have influenced 
the identification of the elusive employee be hashed out. 
 
3.5.1 ILO Employment Relations Recommendation 198 of 2006 (ERR) 
This recommendation was adopted on the 15th of June 2006 and its purpose is to combat disguised 
employment relationships which tend to deprive workers’ protections afforded by labour 
legislation. Article 1 of the recommendation imposes an obligation on member states to define in 
domestic law workers protected by labour legislation. In an attempt to combat disguised 
employment Article 9 provides that in determining the existence of an employment relationship 
emphasis should be on the facts relating to performance of work and remuneration of the worker 
and not the character or contractual arrangement between the parties. For the purpose of facilitating 
the determination of the existence of an employment relationship Article 11 demands that member 
states should prescribe specific indicators or a legal presumption that an employment relationship 
exists, where one or more relevant indicators are present.146 Some of the factors which must be 
taken into account include, supervision and control, integration of the worker, economic 
dependence of the worker, provision of tools and equipment and rendering of services personally 
                                                 
143 See ILO; International Trading Centre, Use of International Law by Domestic Courts, Compendium of Court 
Decisions; 2011 at 3. 
144 The relevance of international law was also recognized in the following cases, S v Makwenyane 1995 (3) SA 391 
(CC); NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd [2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC); Minister of Defence v SANDU (2006) 22 ILJ 2276 
(SCA). 
145 Similar statutory provisions are also found in the EEA, BCEA and SDA. 
146 See Articles 11-13 of the ERR. 
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by the worker. The recommendation acknowledges that the world of work is dynamic and 
encourages member states to establish appropriate mechanisms or make use of existing ones in 
monitoring developments in the labour market and organisation of work and to formulate, apply 
and review relevant laws. Despite regulating disguised employment, the ERR does not address 
triangular employment relationships. These are regulated by the Homework Convention 177 of 
1996 and the Private Employment Agencies Convention 181 of 1997.147 
 
Apart from defining the term employee, South Africa has adopted several innovative measures to 
address the problem of identifying the elusive employee in line with the ERR. Firstly, South 
African courts focus on existence of an employment relationship and not a contract of employment. 
Secondly, some of the provisions of the ERR are incorporated into national law. The ERR requires 
that member states should provide for a legal presumption that an employment relationship exists 
where one or more indicators are present. This presumption exists in sections 200A of the LRA 
and 83A of the BCEA and is a codification of the dominant impression test. In delineating the 
boundary between employment and independent contracting, NEDLAC also issued the Code, 
which assists parties in determining the existence of an employment relationship. It can therefore 
be concluded that the statutory definition of employee is apposite and consistent with international 
labour standards. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Though the first part of the statutory definition of employee is premised on the traditional common 
law contract, the second part broadens the definition to cover workers who are in de facto 
employment relationships despite the absence of the traditional contract. It can be concluded that 
in identifying the elusive employee courts are guided by the principle of primacy of facts in that 
emphasis is on the existence of an employment relationship and not the existence of a valid contract 
of employment. On the basis of section 23 of the Constitution, the purpose of the LRA, section 
200A of the LRA, the Code and international labour standards, there is a sound jurisprudential 
                                                 
147 These conventions are beyond the scope of this discussion but are relevant in identifying the employee and 
employer in triangular employment relationships and home work. Other relevant ILO standards which deal with the 
employment relationship include Part-Time Work Convention 175 of 1994, Maternity Protection Convention 183 of 
2000, Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention 87 of 1948 and Termination of Employment 
Convention 158 of 1982. 
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foundation for a broad interpretation of the definition of employee. The main aim being to cast the 
net of protection wider and cover vulnerable employees. However, the definition is never immune 
from critical reflection, and when necessary revision. 
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                                           CHAPTER FOUR 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the need for labour and social protection of workers in non-standard employment, the 
starting point to any meaningful reform in labour law is the ratification of all international labour 
standards adopted by ILO dealing with the employment relationship. Otherwise the effectiveness 
of the conventions in protecting vulnerable workers will be limited. As noted by Fourie148 
international labour standards that have been ratified can be effective only if the provisions are 
reflected in national legislation and policies. Though the definition of employee is broad enough 
to cover various forms of employment, there is need to revisit the definition and complement it 
with a statutory definition of the contract of employment and employment relationship. The LRA 
only defines the term employee. It does not deal with regulation of the employment contract as a 
specific contract or the concept of work. This is despite the fact that the employment contract is 
the basis of an employment relationship. The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2010 (LRAB) 
had proposed inserting the following definition of a contract of employment in the LRA,  
“it is a common law contract of employment or any other agreement or arrangement under which 
a person agrees to work for an employer but excludes a contract for work as an independent 
contractor.” 
The need for including this definition has been identified by the South Africa Law Commission 
and in decisions by the Labour Court. The main purpose of inserting it is to clarify the uncertainty 
that arises from the fact that the statutory definition of an employee is broader than the equivalent 
common law concept.149 Regrettably, this proposal was removed from the final LRAA, 2014. 
 
Apart from defining the term contract of employment, there is need for labour legislation to define 
the term employment relationship. The courts have only identified criteria for identifying an 
employment relationship in case law without defining the term. International labour standards 
demand that the term be defined or alternatively the employment contract be placed in the broader 
context of the employment relationship. This would necessarily demand that the term worker be 
                                                 
148 Fourie ES “Non-Standard Workers: The South African Context, International Law and Regulation by the 
European Union” (2008) 4 PER/PELJ 23. 
149 Summary of Draft Labour Bills, ILJ 2011 at 57. 
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defined in labour legislation and the criteria for identifying one be codified. This provides clarity 
as to who is an employee. This would also entail the inclusion of a deeming provision in the LRA 
in terms of which one is deemed to be under a contract of employment if the criteria for the 
existence of an employment relationship is satisfied. 
 
Another disquieting aspect about the current LRA is that it does not define the term independent 
contractor or self-employed. The definition of employee in section 213 excludes independent 
contractors from its ambit. The concept of an employee must be seen in contrast to that of an 
independent contractor. Independent contracting was defined in the LRAB as a, 
 “person who works for or supplies services to a client or customer as part of the person’s business, 
undertaking or professional practice.” 
 Inserting such a definition in the LRA will go a long way in ensuring that fraudulent “independent 
contracting” is not used to disguise employment.150 The absence of a definition of employer in the 
LRA has also posed serious threats to the efficacy of labour legislation. The employment 
relationship is a relationship of reciprocity involving the employer and employee. Labour 
legislation identifies the employee but does not define the other party. The LRAB, 2010 once 
proposed the following definition of employer, 
“any person, institution, organisation, or organ of state who employs or provides work to an 
employee or any other person and directly supervises or tacitly or expressly undertakes to 
remunerate or reward such employee for services rendered.” 
Unfortunately, this definition was left out in the LRAA, 2014. Though the identification of an 
employer might appear simple, the rise in externalisation of work arrangements and conducting of 
business through holding companies has resulted in the true identity of the employer being masked. 
It is therefore necessary that the identity of the employer be defined by labour legislation. 
 
One area which also needs revisiting is the presumption of employment in section 200A of the 
LRA and section 83A of the BCEA. This presumption only applies to the LRA and the BCEA. 
There is need for statute to expressly extend its application to other labour legislation and social 
security legislation. Secondly, the presumption does not apply to persons earning more than R205 
433, 30 per annum. With due respect, there is no basis for distinguishing the nature of the 
relationship between the parties exclusively on the basis of income. The presumption must be 
invoked regardless of the income earned by the employee. In addition, section 200A (1) of the 
                                                 
150 Summary of Draft Labour Bills, ILJ, 2011 at 57. 
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LRA states that the presumption applies “regardless of the form of contract”. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 courts have since held that for the presumption to apply there must be a legally 
enforceable or some contractual arrangement in place between the parties. Such a restrictive 
interpretation defeats the purpose the presumption. Section 200A (3) talks of a “work 
arrangement” whilst section 200A (1) refers to a “contract”. Since emphasis in identifying an 
employee is on the existence of an employment relationship, it is submitted that the words “form 
of contract” in section 200A (1) must be removed and substituted with, “form of work 
arrangement.” This will broaden the application of the presumption and ultimately the definition 
of employee without doing any violence to it.  
 
4.2 CONCLUSION 
It is generally accepted that the employment relationship is the best vehicle through which workers 
have access to rights guaranteed by labour legislation. In South Africa it is the predominant 
framework that underpins the operation of the labour market. Unfortunately, the world of work is 
changing resulting in the erosion of standard employment leaving many workers outside the scope 
of protection associated with employment. This has led to the misplaced conclusion that the 
definition of employee is no longer germane with modern work arrangements, the Constitution 
and international labour standards. In other words, it has been argued that the current statutory 
definition of employee is subtle. Despite this assumption there is no need to amend the definition. 
On a positive note, while the definition is still rooted in the common law contract, it is capable of 
an expansive interpretation. The jurisprudential basis for such a purposive interpretation lies in 
international labour standards adopted by ILO, the Constitution and the primary objects of labour 
legislation. On the basis of this broad interpretation it can be concluded that the definition of 
employee does not presuppose the existence of a valid contract. Emphasis is on the existence of 
an employment relationship rather than a contract of employment. 
 
Though interpreted widely, there is potential for the definition failing to adequately cover workers 
in atypical and non-standard employment. It is acknowledged that this problem is attributable to 
the failure by labour legislature to provide statutory definitions for key terms such as contract of 
employment, independent contracting, worker, employment relationship and employer. These 
proposed definitions will not only complement the definition of employee but will also eliminate 
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problems arising from identifying the elusive employee and employer in indecipherable 
circumstances. This would mean that the development of a coherent labour jurisprudence capable 
of standing the test of time can be achieved.  
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